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Abstract: This paper attempts to use applied micro-economic research to understand the impact
of price changes over the period 1999-2011 in Ireland. This measure combines an efficiency
component using a Linear Expenditure System (LES) and an equity component using the
Atkinson Index of Inequality. The efficiency component includes the behavioural response to price
changes for non-subsistence expenditures thereby producing a Cost of Living Index. The Atkinson
Index of Inequality produces an inequality measure and this is combined with the Cost of Living
Index to produce an overall welfare measure. This extends upon the existing Irish literature on
this issue by accounting for this broader set of components. The results show that changes in the
cost of living have differed substantially between households both in terms of demographics 
and the position of the household in the income distribution and that behavioural response 
can potentially improve the welfare position of households in response to price changes in most
years.
I INTRODUCTION
After a decade of relatively low positive price changes, the welfare impactof inflation moved off the policy and research agenda. The recent period of
price volatility amongst necessities such as food, fuel and housing costs as well
as a recent period of deflation has resulted in increased discussion as to the
differential impact of price changes on different socio-economic groups. The
crisis of stagnant economic growth and high debt in many developed countries
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has combined with uncertainty about monetary regimes and, therefore,
increased uncertainty about the future direction of the overall price level. This
paper attempts to use applied micro-economic research to understand the
impact of price changes over the period 1999-2011 in Ireland. However, the
results produce many insights that can improve knowledge and
understanding about the cost of living issue into the future.
The ongoing but intermittent movement in consumer prices combined
with the heterogeneous consumption baskets of different households means
that the welfare impact attributable to price changes can differ greatly
between households over time. The rationale for this paper is to explore the
degree to which price changes impacted differently upon the economic welfare
of Irish households between 1999 and 2011. Numerous studies in other
countries have found substantial differences in changes to the cost of living for
different households. These include Hobijn and Lagakos (2005) which found
that household-specific inflation rates in the USA between 1987 and 2001
varied substantially around the mean inflation rate. Crawford and Smith
(2002) found that from 1976 to 2000, only about one-third of households in the
United Kingdom faced inflation rates within one percentage point of the
average rate in each year.
In Ireland, a recent study by Murphy and Garvey (2004) found that
inflation for the urban poor exceeded the state average by a total of almost 
4 per cent for the period between October 1996 and November 2001. Much of
the difference is attributed to the increase in rent and accommodation charges
and the sharp fall in mortgage interest rates. This widening in the cost of
living gap between the urban poor and the state average occurred despite the
high inflation for many commodities that form a lower share for the urban
poor than the state average. These included entertainment, medical costs,
vehicle insurance and motor tax. Food expenditures were among the
expenditures for which prices rose the most including tea, fresh fruit and
vegetables. Food expenditures are among the most essential expenditures and
large price increases for these expenditures is likely to have increased
inequality.
Murphy and Garvey (2004) focused purely on the direct welfare impact
due to changing prices alone. However, the ability of consumers to alter their
consumption basket in response to price changes means that the welfare loss
or gain from changing prices can be improved for the consumer. The
behavioural response to a price change is less in the case of goods and services
with an inelastic demand such as food than for goods with an elastic demand
that can be considered luxuries. Therefore, a change in the price of the most
essential goods has a lower distortionary impact on the composition of the
consumption basket. 
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This paper departs from the work of Murphy and Garvey (2004) by
measuring the welfare change due to price changes both from the direct
impact but also from the indirect impact due to substitution behaviour.
Murphy and Garvey (2008) did account for behavioural response by producing
Superlative Cost of Living Indices (Fisher and Tornqvist) and found the
counterintuitive result that the behavioural response of consumers to price
increases led to even greater welfare losses than those calculated using the
Consumer Price Index (CPI). The calculation of Superlative Cost of Living
Indices is beyond the scope of this paper as we use a demand system instead.
Sommerville (2004) found a low substitution bias in the CPI of about 0.02 per
annum using the Almost Ideal Demand System model and found that the
growth of the superlative indices actually exceeded the CPI for approximately
half of the period between 1988 and 2001. Sommerville found that the size of
the substitution bias for the AIDS model corresponds closely to that of Irvine
and McCarthy (1978).
A welfare measure must be employed in order to calculate the degree of
substitution behaviour and therefore substitution bias in the Index.
Uncompensated welfare measures such as consumer surplus are usually
considered an insufficient basis for welfare measurement. The main
alternatives available are the Hicksian compensated welfare measures of
equivalent variation and compensating variation. In this case, the compensat -
ing variation is chosen as the welfare measure because it is with reference to
restoring original utility. Hicksian compensated welfare measures should only
be used from an ethical point of view if there is a realistic opportunity for the
consumer to be compensated in income for the price increase. It is otherwise
unethical to proceed with such a measure. The likelihood of compensation is
increasingly unlikely for many households in Ireland given the scale of
unemployment and indebtedness. A fall in real wages via higher prices could
ceteris paribus, be viewed by policymakers as a path towards reducing
unemployment.1 Substitution behaviour will continue to take place but the
prospects of income compensation for price changes is most likely in decline.
Therefore, uncompensated measures of utility may be more appropriate in the
near future. The calculation of price indices for different household groups and
income deciles can potentially inform policymakers to a greater extent about
cost of living changes for specific household types and, therefore, improve the
likelihood of compensation taking place. 
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1 While acknowledging the potential for this view taking hold among policymakers, it is important
to consider that there are perhaps more important dynamics at play. The potential for
expansionary monetary policy to provide for positive co-movement in nominal spending, inflation
and real output means that we should not place too much weight on the real wage-unemployment
trade-off.
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In order to calculate compensating variation, we utilise data from the
House hold Budget Survey, together with a demand system containing
elasticities of the response of households to price and income changes to
produce behaviour adjusted welfare measures of price changes in Ireland. The
transition from private household welfare change to societal welfare change is
made using a social welfare function which accounts for inequality aversion. 
The paper has the following outline. Section II describes the methodology
used in the study. Section III outlines the price data and budget survey data
used in the study. Section IV follows providing the Distributional
Characteristic for different commodities. Section V provides the Compensating
Variation for different demographic groups and consumption deciles in all
years from 1999 to 2011 and the overall welfare effect in each year. This is
followed by the conclusions. 
The results for each household group are the welfare impact of consumer
price changes. It is important to consider that welfare changes not
attributable to price changes can clearly influence welfare to a much greater
extent than welfare changes attributable to price changes. We should,
therefore, keep in mind the broader set of welfare changes that have taken
place for households in Ireland since 1999 including nominal household
incomes and other non-monetary welfare changes. The findings in this paper
can be complemented by a reading of Whelan and Maître (2010) which clearly
shows that many of ‘the economically vulnerable’ earn incomes above the 60
per cent relative poverty line. This should be taken into account as targeted
policy efforts to compensate for increases in the cost of living should not be
based solely on the position of the household in the income distribution or
their demographic composition but also on levels of deprivation and
vulnerability as shown by Whelan and Maître. 
II METHODOLOGY
The tendency of consumers to substitute between goods in response to
price changes has implications for the measurement of the welfare result. A
welfare measure that does not account for this substitution behaviour will
overestimate the welfare loss from a price increase and underestimate the
welfare gain from a price decrease in a given commodity. A measurement of
welfare change must therefore account for this substitution behaviour.
Measuring the impact of substitution behaviour upon consumer welfare can be
done using a demand system, which reports own and cross price elasticities as
well as income elasticities for each commodity group. There are a number of
alternative demand systems that can be used to calculate price elasticities of
demand and, therefore, the overall welfare change due to price changes. These
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include the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) of Deaton and Muellbauer
(1980), the Rotterdam (ROTT) system of Theil (1976) and the LES of Stone
(1954). The AIDS and ROTT models are broadly similar (Barnett and Seck,
2008). Both models require a supply of price and expenditure data from
distinct time periods or geographical areas. 
The suitability of the AIDS and ROTT demand systems for this form of
price analysis is dependent on the extent of price variation during the time
period of the study. We have potentially 10 quarters of price data that are
suitable for this analysis, i.e. five quarters each from the 1999/2000 and
2004/2005 Household Budget Surveys. Bargain et al. (2010) explain that little
price variation is found in the 2004/2005 price data. This reduces the potential
performance of the AIDS model for the calculation of elasticities. When there
is limited price and expenditure data, the LES method, although relatively
crude, can be used to derive estimates of the elasticities required for the
analysis. The LES methodology is based on the explicit use of direct utility
functions and is therefore parametric. This study tries to overcome problems
relating to population heterogeneity by using different household groups with
separate parameters calculated for each group thereby producing twelve
representative households. 
Deaton (1974) critiques the assumption of additivity which is present in
the LES. Creedy (1998) explains that the high degree of structure imposed by
additive utility functions does not allow for complementary goods and requires
approximate proportionality between income and price elasticities but regards
these as the costs of overcoming data limitations. Creedy and Van de Ven
(1996) advise that potential problems are much less severe when broad
commodity groups are used. Other studies to have used the LES include
Madden (1995), Powell (1974) and Lluch, Powell and Williams (1977).
2.1 Utility Function
In order to calculate welfare (utility) at the household level (pre- and post-
price change), we require a utility function. As in the case of Creedy (2001), we
utilise a Stone-Geary LES direct utility function for a:
U =  [xi – γi]φi (1)
i
where xi is consumption for each good i and γi are LES parameters known as
committed or subsistence consumption for each good i and the marginal
budget shares2 are 0  φi  1, iφi = 1. The calculation of subsistence con -
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2 The marginal budget shares φi are the shares of non-subsistence consumption for each
commodity group. The marginal budget share for necessities usually falls below the average
budget share for those most necessary commodities.
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sump tion is a key motivation for the use of the Stone Geary function. The
Engel curves are linear but do not travel through the origin. The substitution
behaviour is assumed to only take place for those expenditures which lie above
the level of subsistence consumption. The higher the level of subsistence
income relative to total expenditure, the lower the scope exists to gain from
substitution behaviour in response to price changes. An important assumption
within the LES is that marginal budget shares remain the same at the new
(post-price change) total expenditure level as under the original total
expenditure level. 
2.2 Equivalent Income
In this work, the Hicksian demand assumption is made that the household
is compensated in money for price increases and penalised in money for price
decreases to the extent that the original level of utility is restored. The amount
of money required to provide the same utility level post-price change as the
utility level under the original prices is the Equivalent income (yeh), a concept
due to King (1983). In this work, equivalent income amounts to the total
expenditure that at some set of new prices pr and given characteristics gives
the same utility as that derived from the original total expenditure and prices
p. Hence the indirect utility function with the new prices [V(pr, ye, z)] is equal
to the indirect utility with the original prices and income [V(p, y, z)] for a
household with income y and demographic characteristics z. The reference
demographic group is a single adult living alone with no children and lower
secondary education. 
Equivalent income is therefore:
yeh = E(pr, V(p, y, z), z) (2)
where E( ) is an expenditure function (i.e. the expenditure necessary with
prices pr to have utility V( ) with demographic characteristics z). 
For convenience we ignore the subscripts, z indicating that different
parameters are estimated for different demographic groups. Maximising
utility subject to the budget constraint C = i pixi, the linear expenditure
function for good i is:
pixi = piγi + φi C – 
j
pjγj (3)
piDifferentiating w.r.t. pi and multiplying by —––, we produce the own pricepixi
elasticity from which the γi parameters (subsistence expenditures) can be
derived:
piγi     piφi            γi(1 – φi)              (ηii + 1)xiηii = —– – —– (γi) = ———– – 1 ⇒ γi = –———–– (4)pixi   pixi xi (1 – φi)
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C
Differentiating (4) w.r.t. C and multiplying by —–, we produce the budget
pixi
elasticity, from which we can derive the φi parameters:
φiCηi = —– (5)pixi
Implies that the marginal budget shares are
ηiciφi = —– = ηiwi (6)C
We can produce the indirect utility function of the LES by substituting
into the direct utility function (3), the Marshallian demand function:
φiV(p, y) =  γi + —– C – j pj γj– γi
φi
i pi
φi iΠ [C – Σj pj γj]φi=  — C – j pj γj
φi
= ———–––––— (7)
i pi Π
i
[pi/φi]φi
C – Σj pj γj=  ———–––
Π
i
[pi/φi]φi
Cross-multiplying, the LES expenditure function for price pi is:
E(p, U, z) = C = i  pjγj + i (pi/φi)φi V(p, y) (8)
While the expenditure function for price pr,i is:
E(pr, U, z) = i pr,iγi + i  (pr,i/φi)φi  U (9)
Where U = V(p, y)
Hence from (7) and (9) we can produce the equivalent income necessary to
produce utility U (based upon consumption C and price pi), when prices are pr,i.
C – i  piγiye = i pr,iγi + i (pr,i/φi)φi –——––––— Πi(pi/φi)φi (10)
= i pr,iγi + i (pr,i/pi)φiC – i  piγi
2.3 Compensating Variation
The change in household welfare due to price changes is the Compensating
Variation, i.e. the change in equivalent income due to price changes. Using the
new prices as the reference prices pr in Equation (10), the Compensating
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Variation is the post-price change equivalent income minus the original
income before the price change. 
CV = Ye – Y (11)
The Compensating Variation can be defined as the minimum amount of
money required to compensate the household for the price change so that the
utility level at the new prices equals the utility level under the original prices.
Hence:
CV = E(pr, V(p, y, z), z) – E(p, V(p, y, z), z) (12)
2.4 Social Welfare Calculation
In order to scale up the individual impacts on welfare of a price change, we
utilise a social welfare function. If citizens are indifferent to the differential
inequality impact of price changes, then the sum of private household welfare
gains or losses will equal the total change to societal welfare. In the presence
of societal inequality aversion, citizens are concerned about the inequality
impact of price changes outside of their own private welfare, which can be
captured by a social welfare function. As in the case of Madden (1995), we
utilise a variant of the Atkinson (1970) social welfare function:
1        (vh)1–e
W = — h —–— (13)H        1 – e
Where H is the number of households and e is the inequality aversion
parameter that relates to how much a transfer from rich to poor will improve
social welfare; the higher the value of e the more a transfer will improve
welfare.3 This formula implies that additional consumption provides greater
additional utility for low income than high income households. This means
that the same price increase has a more adverse welfare impact upon low
income than high income households. The degree to which inflation and
thereby welfare affects low income households depends in part upon the
degree of inequality aversion that exists in society and the relative
composition of consumption baskets for low income households. 
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3 In the case of there being a two person society with one individual having twice the income of
another, an inequality aversion parameter of 0.3 indicates that total welfare is improved by a one
euro transfer from rich to poor so long as the amount lost in the transaction is less than 19 cent.
For an inequality aversion parameter of 0.8, the transfer improves total societal welfare so long
as the amount lost in the transaction is less than 42.5 cent. Amiel et al. (1999) find that measures
of inequality aversion can be obtained with some precision and calculate a value of 0.3 for students
in Australia and Israel. Blinder (1978) found that inequality aversion for US citizens is in the
range of 0.1 to 0.2.
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Excluding the inequality aversion parameter, we assume that utility for
each household equals consumption, vc = ch. Including the inequality aversion
parameter means that a change in vh or ch results in the following: 
∂W      1θ h = —— = — (ch)–e
∂ch H
Atkinson’s measure of inequality is
1— h(yeh)(1–e)
1⁄(1–e)
H                                    yedeA(e) = 1 – ––––––––––––––––––  = 1 – —– (14)y–e y–e
For our purposes, we assume that  yh = ch = vh i.e. that total household
income equals total expenditure. This restriction means that savings are
ignored. Combining this with our Social Welfare Function W, we produce a
Social Welfare Function based upon equivalent income:
1        (yeh)1–e      (yede)1–eW = — h —––— = ——— (15)H         1 – e       1 – e
where yede = y
–
e (1 – A)(e)) and y
–
e  is the  mean equivalent income and A(e) is
Atkinson’s inequality of equivalent income. yede the equally distributed
equivalent value can be interpreted as the equivalent income that if
distributed equally across the population produces the same value of social
welfare as the existing distribution of income. It captures the trade-off
between equity and efficiency. The higher yede the higher the product of mean
equivalent income (efficiency) and equality, hence an increase in equality or
efficiency can increase yede.
III DATA
3.1 Expenditure Data
In order to produce our welfare estimates and derive our demand system,
we require micro data that contains expenditure at the household level. We
use the Irish Household Budget Survey (HBS) data of 1999/2000 and
2004/2005 for this study. There are 7,644 households and 525 expenditure
items (expenditure greater than zero) in the 1999/2000 HBS. There are 6,884
households and 805 expenditure items (expenditure greater than zero) in the
2004/2005 HBS. These expenditure items are divided into twenty-one
commodity groups. 
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The choice of grouped budget shares has the following advantages:
● It reduces the impact of the zero expenditures problem, which could
substantially undermine the results of OLS regressions.4
● Estimates for smaller groups of goods could be unstable.
● In any case, twenty-one categories are a number sufficient to allow for
a substantial degree of heterogeneity in inflation and consumption
behaviour. 
● Total Consumption for this study is defined as the monetary value of
non-durable and durable goods and services purchased during the
period of the survey.5
3.2 Price Data
The increases in the overall CPI from 1999-2011 (Table A3) are considered
low by most economists and are much lower than those experienced during the
1970s and early 1980s. However, considerable divergence between commodity
group inflation rates exists so that the welfare impact of changing prices may
differ greatly between different households and income levels over time. 
The price data is taken from the CSO. This data provides the annual price
level for twenty-one commodity groups from 1998 to 2011. The price inflation
for each commodity is calculated with the same method as the overall
Consumer Price Index, a Laspeyres Price Index. In addition, we calculate the
Cost of Living Index using the Linear Expenditure System (LES). We use the
price level for 1998 to calculate the increase in the cost of living for 1999. The
use of only twenty-one commodity groups does not pose major problems
because the LES is best using a small number of commodity groups. However,
an important assumption is that there is no price variation within commodity
groups and the substitution effect within commodity groups is not calculated
because of the limitations posed by the LES method. The calculation of the
commodity group inflation rates is done by subtracting the current year’s price
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4 A zero expenditure, can be due not only to infrequent purchases, but also to abstention from
consumption: this is a problem relevant only for a few goods of our list (alcohol and tobacco); we
deal with this problem for tobacco by including a smoker variable in the demographic
characteristics. We find that the exclusion of the zero expenditures has minimal impact on the size
of the behavioural response component in the model so that it is not a major issue. The inclusion
of independent variables such as smoker, car owner and mortgage holder help overcome the
limitations posed by zero expenditures. We make no adjustment for alcohol. These are listed in
Table A1.
5 This definition does not include: the imputed rents for home owners and the value of houses
eventually purchased, the amounts paid for direct taxes or social security contributions, the value
of home production, the value of debt repayment (interest repayments are included), the value of
gifts received (but includes contribution to churches or associations, etc.).
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level p1 from the previous year p0 and dividing this by the price level of the
previous year p0. 
((p1 – p0)/(p0) (16)
3.3 Estimating Budget and Price Elasticities
The price elasticities of demand are used to impute the levels of
subsistence expenditure for each good as shown by Equation (4). These are
only imputations and cannot be taken as precise estimates of subsistence
expenditures. The price elasticities of demand are calculated using the OLS
regression method in Equation (17). The method assumes that a commodity
with a low price elasticity of demand of approximately –0.2 leads to the
imputation of a high level of subsistence expenditure for that commodity. In
contrast, high price elasticities of demand lead to the imputation of low levels
of subsistence expenditure and in many cases zero where the price elasticity
of demand is less than –1, i.e. elastic. 
The price elasticity of demand, 
δxkh piηhk,i = —— —–, (17)δpi xih
Creedy (2001) describes an approximate method for producing price
elasticities. Rather than estimating a system of demand equations, it relies on
a method due to Frisch (1959) that describes own and cross-price elasticities
in terms of total expenditure (budget) elasticities (ηi), budget shares (wi) and
the “Frisch” marginal utility of income parameter (ξ) for directly additive
utility functions.6 Lluch, Powell and Williams (1977) found results conforming
with that of Frisch that the expenditure elasticity of the marginal utility of
income is negative and declines in value with GNP per capita. They
empirically showed based upon a log linear regression analysis that the Frisch
parameter declines by approximately 0.36 per cent for every one per cent
increase in GNP per capita or that – ξ  = 0.36 (real GNP per head in 1970 US
dollars). Rather than assuming a constant elasticity relationship between ξ
and total expenditure, we follow a method due to Creedy and Dixon (1998)
which elaborated on the Lluch, Powell and Williams model as follows:
ln (–ξ) = φ – α ln (C/ER + ϑ) (18)
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must exert a degree of caution over the results.
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where the parameters φ, α and ϑ are ad hoc parameters (here respectively 7.1,
1.05, 177) derived by trial and error. The C parameter represents mean total
expenditure per head and ER represents the exchange rate parameter. Frisch
showed that the elasticities can be written as follows:
ηj ηiδijηij = – ηiwj 1 + — + —––, (19)ξ                    ξ
pj cjwhere ξij = 1 if i = j, 0 otherwise and wj = —– is the budget share for good jC
(See Creedy, 2001 for more details).
In order to calculate the budget elasticities, consumption on particular
goods is estimated as budget shares of total consumption, utilising Engel
functions. 
wi = α + β1 ln CHBS + δXHBS (20)
where wi = ith budget share, C is total non-durable consumption and X is the
same set of demographic characteristics used above. 
The coefficients produced by Equation (20) are included in Table A4a and
Table A4b. These coefficients are taken from the 2004/2005 Household Budget
Survey data and using the OLS regression method with correction for
heteroskedasticity.7 These coefficients are used to calculate the welfare
measure from 1999 onwards as provided in Table 7. This means that the
coefficients from the 1999/2000 Household Budget Survey are not used to
calculate the overall welfare measure in Table 7. Employing coefficients from
both surveys would clutter the presentation of results and the overall change
in the cost of living differs little according to the choice of budget survey as
Table 5 shows. The coefficients from the 1999/2000 Household Budget Survey
data are used in Tables 4 and 5 to show the percentage change in the cost of
living. The estimates are at the household level as budget shares for each
individual are not available in the Household Budget Survey.  
One can see from Table A4a the negative sign for the log of consumption
(lcgrp1-lcgrp12).8 This shows that additional units of log consumption
significantly reduce the proportion of expenditure devoted to food. This is not
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7 The dependent variable is bounded at zero and one and the OLS method can therefore
potentially bias the estimates. The fractional logit method was tested as an alternative estimator
and the results showed little change in the value of the estimates. The survey weighting factors
are not used in the regressions.     
8 The log of consumption for each household group (lcgrp) is calculated and the attached number
corresponds to the number of the household group.
02 Loughrey article_ESRI Vol 42-1  28/03/2012  14:42  Page 42
surprising given that food is a necessity and the food share should decline as
total expenditure rises. The other highly inelastic goods include
communications, local authority rents, refuse collection, electricity, natural
gas, liquid fuels and solid fuels. All of these commodity groups are negatively
related to the log of consumption in the budget share regressions (Tables A4a
and A4b). Therefore, an increase in total expenditure leads to a decline in the
budget share for each of these commodity groups. The log of consumption is
positively and significantly related to a number of commodity groups including
clothing, furniture, health, transport, education and restaurants. A unit
increase in total expenditure will lead to an increase in the proportion of
expenditure devoted to these expenditures. These commodities are shown to
be among the most elastic commodity groups (Table 1).
The independent variables in the budget share regression manage to
capture some of the variation in budget share that is not due simply to
changes in total expenditure. Tables A4a and A4b show that being a smoker is
associated with a number of expenditures including a reduction in the
proportion of expenditure spent on food, clothing, health, furniture and
household maintenance and an increase in the proportion spent on local
authority rents. Car ownership is positively associated with health and
mortgage interest shares and negatively associated with the share for food,
alcohol and tobacco, clothing, furniture and household maintenance and
communications. 
Being an employee is negatively associated with the share for rents,
alcohol and tobacco and positively associated with mortgage interest
repayments. Being self-employed is positively associated with the food share,
mortgage interest and negatively associated with rents. Employment is
therefore a clear contributory factor in the size of the mortgage interest
repayment. The employment variables could potentially pick up some of the
variation in the savings rate between households given that total income is not
among the independent variables. The education of the household head is
negatively related to the food and transport shares for both university and
upper secondary. Household heads with lower education are the base category.
Health, communications and private rents are all positively associated with
the household head having upper secondary or university level education. The
number of children in the household is positively associated with the share for
food and electricity and negatively associated with the share for restaurants
with some variation in the significance in the case of restaurants according to
the age bracket of the children. This suggests that households with children
substitute away from restaurant expenditure towards home cooking. The
number of adults over 64 years old is positively related at the one per cent
level to the food share and negatively to rents and electricity. The number of
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earners is negatively related to the food and education shares and positively
to restaurants.
Table 1: Budget Share Elasticity and Price Elasticity of Demand for Twenty-
One Commodity Groups: 1999 and 2004 Budget Surveys
Budget Year 1999 2004
Budget Price Budget Price
Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity Elasticity
1 Food 0.21 –0.17 0.25 –0.20
2 Alcohol and Tobacco 1.07 –0.74 1.02 –0.75
3 Clothing 1.59 –1.08 1.41 –1.01
4 Furniture and Household 1.29 –0.89 1.34 –0.96
Maintenance
5 Health 1.69 –1.15 1.50 –1.06
6 Transport 1.27 –0.89 1.26 –0.92
7 Communications 0.43 –0.30 0.57 –0.42
8 Leisure 1.04 –0.73 1.14 –0.83
9 Education 1.45 –0.98 1.40 –0.99
10 Restaurant 1.40 –0.96 1.28 –0.92
11 Other 1.22 –0.84 1.16 –0.84
12 Local Authority Rents –0.31 0.23 –0.08 0.07
13 Private Rents 0.65 –0.46 0.74 –0.54
14 Mortgage Interest 0.81 –0.58 0.82 –0.60
15 Materials for Maintenance and 1.67 –1.14 1.63 –1.15
Repair of Dwelling
16 Services for Maintenance and 0.83 –0.57 1.20 –0.86
Repair of Dwelling
17 Refuse Collection 1.43 –0.96 0.25 –0.18
18 Electricity 0.08 –0.05 0.06 –0.04
19 Natural Gas 0.90 –0.61 0.83 –0.59
20 Liquid Fuels 0.05 –0.03 –0.08 0.07
21 Solid Fuels –0.87 0.62 –0.46 0.35
IV RESULTS I: DISTRIBUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Before undertaking our behavioural analysis, we firstly undertake a
descriptive analysis of the distributional characteristics of the expenditure
groups we are analysing in this study. To do this we utilise a measure known
as the distributional characteristic used in Newbery (1995), Liberati (2001)
and Madden (2009). The distributional characteristic is based upon a static
analysis of the distribution of expenditure over the population and the welfare
weights placed upon different groups.  It is based on a Social Welfare Function
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(SWF) W = (v1,…,vH), where vh = vh(ch, p) is the indirect utility function of
household h for expenditure c and prices p.9
We define the impact of change in price as follows:
∂W         ∂W   ∂vh               ∂W ∂vh ∂cih–— =  –— · —– =  –— · —– · –— = –  θ h xih, (21)∂pi h vh ∂pi h vh ∂cih ∂pi h
δW    δvh
where θ h = —– · —– and cih = pixih, θh, is the social marginal utility of totalδvh δcih
expenditures for household h and xih is the consumption of good i by household
h. 
Σhθhcihdi = ——–—, (22)θ– Σhcih
where θ– is the average social welfare weight. The more a good is consumed by
households with higher social marginal utilities (social weight), the higher is
di. If however we apply constant social welfare weights (i.e. we are indifferent
between households of different income), then di = 1, i.
We report the Distributional Characteristics of each commodity to provide
some context as to the potential impact of price changes in different
commodity groups from a purely distributional perspective. The E value
represents the degree of inequality aversion and results are presented for two
levels of inequality aversion. The following results indicate the relative
desirability of price increases in twenty-one commodity groups from a purely
distributional perspective. The DC results are presented below for the 1999
and 2004 Household Budget Surveys using two levels of inequality aversion.
This information helps one to recognise the differential impact of price
changes upon welfare for households at different points in the income
distribution.  
The higher distributional statistics (lower ranked) imply that these goods
are purchased more intensively by low income households. There are few
changes in the rankings in response to different levels of inequality aversion
in both years. The results for 1999 and 2004 show that local authority rents is
the commodity consumed most intensively by low income households relative
to high income households. Food, solid and liquid fuels are among the other
commodities consumed most intensively by low income households. Education,
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mortgage interest and transport are the commodities consumed most
intensively by high income households. 
The big changes between 1999 and 2004 are that expenditures on
furniture and household maintenance, communications, alcohol, tobacco and
mortgage interest spending became more concentrated among high income
households i.e. spending on these commodities came more from high income
households. Restaurant, refuse collection, clothing and transport expenditures
became more concentrated among low income households. The results 
suggest that price increases for local authority rents, food, electricity, solid and
liquid fuels impact greater upon the welfare of low income households than for
high income households. The results also suggest that price increases for
education, mortgage interest, furniture and household maintenance impact
greater upon the welfare of high income households than for low income
households. 
Table 2: Distributional Characteristics 1999 and 2004
1999 Rank 1999 Rank 2004 Rank 2004 Rank
(E=0.3) (E=0.8) (E=0.3) (E=0.8)
Local Authority Rents 1.07 1 1.20 1 1.09 1 1.26 1
Solid Fuels 1.04 2 1.09 2 1.03 2 1.06 2
Electricity 0.97 4 0.93 4 0.98 3 0.94 3
Food 0.98 3 0.94 3 0.98 4 0.94 4
Liquid Fuels 0.97 5 0.91 5 0.98 5 0.93 5
Refuse Collection 0.92 10 0.80 10 0.97 6 0.91 6
Private Rents 0.93 9 0.81 9 0.96 7 0.89 7
Natural Gas 0.93 8 0.83 8 0.95 8 0.87 8
Communications 0.95 6 0.86 6 0.95 9 0.86 9
Alcohol and Tobacco 0.94 7 0.84 7 0.94 10 0.84 10
Restaurant 0.90 13 0.75 14 0.91 11 0.77 12
Leisure 0.92 11 0.79 11 0.91 12 0.78 11
Other 0.90 15 0.74 15 0.90 13 0.76 13
Clothing 0.89 17 0.72 16 0.90 14 0.76 14
Services for Maintenance 
and Repair of Dwelling 0.91 12 0.78 12 0.89 15 0.75 15
Furniture and Household 
Maintenance 0.90 14 0.76 13 0.89 16 0.74 16
Transport 0.88 20 0.72 20 0.89 17 0.73 17
Education 0.89 16 0.72 17 0.89 18 0.72 18
Health 0.88 21 0.71 21 0.88 19 0.72 19
Materials for Maintenance 
and Repair of Dwelling 0.89 19 0.72 18 0.86 20 0.68 20
Mortgage Interest 0.89 18 0.72 19 0.86 21 0.67 21
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V RESULTS II: COMPENSATING VARIATION AND TOTAL WELFARE
EFFECT
The results in this section reveal the extent to which changes in the cost
of living have differed between households over time and the contribution of
price changes towards overall societal welfare. The Compensating Variation
results show the change in the cost of living for different household groups for
each year between 1999 and 2011. The total welfare effect is the effect of cost
of living changes upon total societal welfare accounting for both private
household welfare change and inequality aversion. The results produced using
the chosen social welfare function show that private welfare changes the
inequality effect in all years. This means that the sum of private household
welfare changes does not depart far from the overall societal welfare change
given the choice of social welfare function. Large differences between
household groups are observed in some years thereby indicating that the
Consumer Price Index is not always an accurate measure of the cost of living
for different demographic groups and lends support to the case for a more
disaggregated approach towards the reporting of price indices.  
5.1 Changes in Compensating Variation by Household Group
The compensating variation measures the welfare change attributable to
cost of living changes for each household and is calculated using Equation (11).
Expressing the compensating variation as a percentage of total expenditure
approximates the percentage change in the cost of living. The bottom row of
Table 3 and Table 4 give the rate of change in the cost of living from 1999 to
2011 for the entire population. The Table 3 results are with reference to the
1999/2000 Household Budget Survey and Table 4 is with reference to the
2004/2005 Household Budget Survey. These results differ from the Consumer
Price Index reported by the CSO, because of some aggregation issues,10 the
adjustment for substitution bias and the holding of the budget survey
constant.  
The results show that there are considerable differences between
household groups in terms of the welfare impact of price changes in 1999,
2006, 2007 and 2009 but less in other years. Beginning with 2009, the first
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weights. We adjust the mortgage interest, alcohol and tobacco shares to be consistent with the CPI
weights for the 2004/2005 Household Budget Survey but the same rescaling value is applied
across the population and this may differ from the CSO method. We do the same for the alcohol
and tobacco component in the restaurant and hotel expenditure category.
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year of deflation, the results show that households with a maximum of one
child (groups 1, 3, 5, 7 and 8) benefitted from a fall of at least 5 per cent in the
price level and thereby surpassing the average decline in the cost of living by
at least 1.5 per cent. Single adults with one child (group 3) benefitted from a
5.9 per cent decline in the cost of living in 2009. The price index for both
mortgage interest and rents fell dramatically in 2009 (Table A3). Those
household groups with low budget shares for mortgage interest and rents
benefitted from a much lower rate of deflation. Households including people
over the age of 64 (groups 2, 6 and 10) benefitted from deflation by less than 2
per cent.  
The results for 2010 shows that price changes reduced the cost of living on
average at a lower rate than in 2009. However, some households departed
from the average trend. Households including old people and more than one
person (groups 6 and 10) experienced a larger drop in the cost of living in 2010
than in the case of 2009. This is partly due to higher than average budget
shares for food and most home heating expenditures which declined in price in
2010. Single adults with children experienced the highest deflation of all
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Table 3: Welfare Change from Consumer Price Changes 1999-201111 by
Household Group Using the 2004/2005 Household Budget Survey
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 –0.5 5.9 5.2 3.4 2.5 2.2 2.7 4.5 5.4 3.5 –5.7 –1.1 2.5
2 2.7 5.7 3.9 4.4 3.5 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.4 3.4 –1.8 –1.7 1.3
3 0.7 6.0 5.5 3.6 2.2 1.4 2.3 4.0 5.3 3.5 –5.9 –2.0 2.0
4 1.7 5.5 4.7 4.1 2.9 1.4 1.7 2.9 3.9 3.3 –3.4 –2.4 1.4
5 –0.2 6.0 4.8 3.5 2.6 2.2 2.6 4.3 4.9 3.6 –5.2 –0.8 2.6
6 2.8 5.6 3.7 4.7 3.7 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.2 3.3 –1.3 –1.4 1.5
7 –0.7 5.9 5.0 3.3 2.4 2.2 2.7 4.5 5.2 3.7 –5.7 –0.8 2.8
8 –0.6 5.7 5.0 3.3 2.3 2.1 2.5 4.4 5.1 3.7 –5.6 –0.9 2.8
9 0.1 5.6 4.7 3.6 2.6 2.1 2.3 3.9 4.5 3.6 –4.6 –0.9 2.5
10 2.8 4.9 4.4 4.0 3.2 1.4 1.2 2.1 3.0 4.3 –0.9 –3.0 0.6
11 1.0 5.1 3.9 4.0 3.0 1.8 1.8 2.9 3.4 3.1 –3.1 –1.4 1.8
12 1.9 5.4 3.7 4.4 3.4 2.0 2.0 2.7 3.0 2.9 –2.4 –1.4 1.4
Total 0.7 5.6 4.4 3.9 2.9 2.1 2.3 3.5 4.1 3.3 –4.0 –1.2 2.1
1=single person, no children, under 65 2=one old person without children, 3=single
person with 1 child, 4=single parent with more than 2 children, 5=young couple
without children, 6=couple without children and with at least one spouse more than 65,
7=couple with one child, 8=couple with 2 children, 9=couple with 3 or more children,
10=family without children including person over 64, 11=family where more children
than 1 and number of adults more than 3, 12=other
Note: Price Changes include Mortgage interest changes
11 CSO 2004/2005 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata files.
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household groups in 2010 (groups 3 and 4). These households have high
budget shares for rents and the price index for rents declined by 6 per cent in
2010. In addition, these households have above average shares for most home
heating expenditures and food so that price declines for these most necessary
expenditures favoured these households to a greater extent than other
households. The 2011 results show that households including people over the
age of 64 (groups 2, 6 and 10) experienced lower than average increases in the
cost of living. This is largely due to the 20.4 per cent increase in mortgage
interest costs. It should be noted that there remains the possibility that
households including people over the age of 64 are supporting their offspring
in meeting mortgage debt repayments and these transfers are not accounted
for in the analysis.   
In the first year of the budget survey itself (2004), the index for private
rents declined by 4.2 per cent (Table A3). Single people with children (groups
3 and 4) benefitted from lower than average increase in the cost of living as a
result. The mortgage interest index increased by 12.3 per cent in 2005 (Table
A3). Household groups 1, 5 and 7 had a bigger increase in the cost of living
than the average household largely due to this increase. There appears to have
been large variation between household groups in 2006. Mortgage interest
rose by 31.5 per cent and the same household groups as in 2009 lost welfare
attributable to much higher increases in the cost of living. This trend
continued for 2007 as mortgage interest increased by 40.3 per cent. The large
increase in food prices, local authority rents and mortgage interest in 2008
were not sufficient to produce large differentials in the cost of living between
household groups.  
It is best to analyse the trend for 1999 to 2003 using the 1999/2000
Household Budget Survey. A brief comparison of Table 3 and Table 4 will show
that the average change in the cost of living does not differ much whether one
uses the 1999/2000 Household Budget Survey or the 2004/2005 survey. There
are however some differences within household groups. In the first year under
study (1999), the large decline in the mortgage interest price index benefitted
many households with young adults (groups 1, 7 and 8) because of high budget
shares in mortgage interest. Single adults with one child (group 3) experienced
the greatest deflation of 0.8 per cent as the low budget share for healthcare
expenditures meant that such households did not lose as much from the
healthcare price increase. 
The rise in the cost of living peaked at 5.5 per cent in the following year
but there appears to have been little difference between household groups.
The large increase in food prices of 6.5 per cent in 2001 (Table A3) was
overshadowed by the even larger increase in the index for mortgage interest
(24.8), local authority rents (13.7), private rents (14.6) and refuse collection
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(26.8). This meant that household groups with the highest food shares did not
have the biggest increases in the cost of living. In this year, the greatest
increase in the cost of living was experienced by single adults with children
(group 3) and therefore reversing the trend of the previous year. Households
including old people only experienced the highest increase in the cost of living
in 2002 compared to other household groups. This was due to the large
increase in healthcare costs of 10 per cent. The same adverse trend for older
people continued in 2003 as such households continued to lose from high
healthcare spending while not benefitting directly from cost reductions in
clothing, rents and mortgage interest to the same extent as other household
groups. 
The differential change in the cost of living between households appears
just as strong in the case of households at different points of the income
distribution as between households with different demographic character -
istics.
Taking the 2004/2005 Household Budget Survey as a base, one can see
that from 2006 to 2011, the gap in the cost of living change in each year was
0.9 per cent or greater between the top and bottom decile. This difference is
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Table 4: Welfare Change from Consumer Price Changes 1999-201112 by
Household Group Using the 1999/2000 Household Budget Survey
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
1 0.2 5.7 4.8 3.7 2.6 1.9 2.3 3.9 4.6 3.3 –4.8 –1.4 2.2
2 2.7 5.4 4.0 4.5 3.5 1.8 1.9 2.4 2.5 3.7 –1.5 –1.9 1.4
3 –0.8 6.0 5.7 3.0 1.9 1.6 2.4 4.7 6.0 3.8 –6.7 –1.5 2.8
4 1.1 5.3 5.0 3.9 2.9 1.5 1.7 3.1 4.3 3.8 –3.6 –2.5 1.5
5 0.4 5.9 4.6 3.6 2.7 2.0 2.3 3.8 4.4 3.4 –4.6 –1.1 2.3
6 2.6 5.4 3.5 4.4 3.4 1.9 1.8 2.2 2.2 3.4 –1.8 –1.6 1.4
7 –0.6 5.9 5.2 3.2 2.2 2.0 2.5 4.4 5.2 3.7 –5.8 –1.0 2.8
8 –0.7 5.7 5.2 3.2 2.2 2.0 2.4 4.4 5.1 3.8 –5.8 –1.0 2.9
9 0.0 5.5 4.9 3.4 2.3 1.8 2.1 3.9 4.6 3.7 –4.9 –1.3 2.5
10 1.9 4.8 3.4 3.0 2.1 1.0 1.5 1.8 1.8 3.5 –3.5 –2.1 1.5
11 1.4 5.2 4.0 3.9 3.1 1.8 1.6 2.7 3.3 3.2 –2.9 –1.8 1.5
12 2.0 5.3 3.8 4.3 3.4 1.9 1.8 2.6 2.9 2.9 –2.3 –1.7 1.3
Total 0.9 5.5 4.4 3.8 2.9 1.9 2.0 3.3 3.8 3.3 –3.8 –1.4 2.0
1=single person, no children, under 65, 2=one old person without children, 3=single
person with 1 child, 4=single parent with more than 2 children, 5=young couple
without children, 6=couple without children and with at least one spouse more than 65,
7=couple with one child, 8=couple with 2 children, 9=couple with 3 or more children,
10=family without children including person over 64, 11=family where more children
than 1 and number of adults more than 3, 12=other
12 CSO 1999/2000 Household Budget Survey anonymised microdata files.
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Table 5: Welfare Loss of Consumer Price Changes Including Mortgage
Interest Repayments 1999-2011 by Decile of Equivalised Total Expenditure
1999/2000 Household Budget Survey
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Poorest 2.1 4.9 4.6 4.0 3.0 1.5 1.7 2.5 3.4 4.9 –2.4 –2.2 1.7
2 2.0 5.1 4.4 4.0 3.0 1.6 1.7 2.6 3.4 4.4 –2.6 –2.0 1.7
3 1.6 5.3 4.4 3.9 2.9 1.7 1.8 2.8 3.6 4.1 –3.0 –1.8 1.8
4 1.4 5.5 4.4 3.9 2.9 1.8 1.9 3.1 3.8 4.0 –3.3 –1.6 1.9
5 1.4 5.5 4.3 3.9 3.0 1.8 2.0 3.1 3.7 3.8 –3.3 –1.5 1.9
6 1.2 5.7 4.4 3.9 3.0 1.9 2.1 3.3 3.9 3.6 –3.6 –1.4 2.0
7 0.9 5.8 4.5 3.9 2.9 2.0 2.2 3.5 4.0 3.6 –3.8 –1.3 2.1
8 0.6 5.9 4.6 3.8 2.8 2.1 2.3 3.8 4.3 3.5 –4.4 –1.1 2.3
9 0.6 6.0 4.6 3.8 2.9 2.2 2.4 3.9 4.3 3.4 –4.4 –1.1 2.3
Richest 0.5 6.2 4.7 3.8 2.8 2.1 2.4 4.0 4.4 3.3 –4.8 –1.1 2.3
Total 0.9 5.8 4.5 3.9 2.9 2.0 2.2 3.5 4.1 3.6 –4.0 –1.3 2.1
2004/2005 Household Budget Survey
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Poorest 2.3 5.4 4.2 4.2 3.4 1.9 2.3 2.6 3.3 4.6 –2.4 –1.7 1.8
2 2.0 5.4 4.1 4.2 3.3 1.9 2.2 2.6 3.3 4.1 –2.6 –1.6 1.8
3 1.7 5.6 4.2 4.1 3.2 1.9 2.2 2.9 3.6 3.9 –3.0 –1.5 1.9
4 1.4 5.6 4.3 4.0 3.1 2.0 2.2 3.1 3.7 3.7 –3.3 –1.4 2.0
5 1.3 5.7 4.3 4.0 3.1 2.1 2.3 3.2 3.8 3.6 –3.4 –1.3 2.0
6 0.8 5.8 4.4 3.9 3.0 2.1 2.4 3.6 4.1 3.6 –3.9 –1.1 2.3
7 0.7 5.8 4.5 3.9 2.9 2.1 2.4 3.7 4.2 3.5 –4.1 –1.1 2.3
8 0.5 6.0 4.5 3.8 2.9 2.2 2.5 3.8 4.4 3.5 –4.4 –1.0 2.3
9 0.6 6.2 4.6 3.9 3.0 2.3 2.6 4.0 4.5 3.5 –4.5 –0.9 2.4
Richest –0.3 6.3 5.0 3.7 2.6 2.4 2.7 4.6 5.1 3.5 –5.6 –0.7 2.7
Total 0.7 5.9 4.5 3.9 2.9 2.2 2.5 3.7 4.3 3.6 –4.2 –1.1 2.3
over 1.5 per cent in 2006, 2007 and 2009. In 2006, there was a 2 per cent gap
between the top and bottom decile largely driven by mortgage interest
repayments. A similar trend occurred in 2007. The large increase in food prices
in 2008 manifested itself in higher increases for those in the bottom two
deciles. In 2009, the gap between those at the bottom and the top was 3.2 per
cent using the 2004/2005 Household Budget Survey as a base. The cost of
living for households at the bottom of the distribution declined by around 2.5
per cent and by above 4.5 per cent at the top of the distribution. The 2010
results show that households in the bottom of the distribution experienced
declines in the cost of living to a greater extent than households at the top of
the distribution. This is driven by declining food prices and home heating
costs.
The 2011 results show that households in the bottom of the distribution
experienced lower increases in the cost of living relative to households at the
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top of the distribution. This is largely due to the 20.4 per cent increase in
mortgage interest costs during the year and despite the 6.6 per cent increase
in electricity and natural gas prices and the 24.2 per cent increase in the price
of liquid fuels. Table 2 shows that expenditures for these three items are
concentrated more among lower income households relative to other
expenditures. 
Taking the 1999/2000 Household Budget Survey data as a base, one can
see that price changes in 1999 caused a 0.5 per cent increase in the cost of
living while the bottom decile experienced an increase of 2.1 per cent in the
cost of living. This was partially reversed the following year as households
higher in the distribution experienced higher increases. Murphy and Garvey
(2004) identified larger cost of living changes for poor urban households
between 1996 and 2001. There is some overlap with that study. We find that
price changes increased inequality in 1999 but not 2000 and 2001 and that the
1999 inequality increase could dominate the inequality reducing effect in 2000
and 2001. 
5.2 Decomposing Welfare Changes
The results from Table 6 show that the percentage change in the equally
distributed level of equivalent income (yede) is similar to the percentage change
in the cost of living for each year shown in Table 5. This suggests that the
changes in the Atkinson Index of Inequality, attributable to price changes, do
not have a large effect on the size of the overall welfare measure. The results
are sensitive in some cases, however, to the size of the inequality aversion
parameter. For instance, the decline in yede is 0.3 per cent greater in 1999
using the inequality aversion parameter of 0.8 than in the case of the
parameter value of 0.3. The increase in yede is 0.3 per cent greater in 2009
using the higher inequality aversion parameter of 0.8 than in the case of the
parameter value of 0.3. Table 5 shows that changes in the cost of living were
particularly different between income deciles in those two years relative to the
percentage change for the average household.  
The original yede under the parameter value of 0.3 is €706.67. This means
that the average total household expenditure accounting for inequality
aversion (E=0.3) is €706.67. The absence of inequality aversion and price
changes would mean that yede simply equates to the average total household
expenditure of €792. The original yede under the parameter value of 0.8 is
€614.67. The lower in that case is due to the higher value of the Atkinson
Index of Inequality under the higher inequality aversion parameter value. 
The results from Table 7 show that the private welfare changes
attributable to consumer prices far outweigh the inequality component in
terms of their impact upon overall welfare. The extent of this result depends
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Table 6: Change in The Level of Equally Distributed Equivalent Income (Yede)
using Alternative Values of Inequality Aversion (E)
Inequality Aversion Parameter Value Inequality Aversion Parameter Value
E=0.3 E=0.8
Original Yede Post Percentage Original Yede Post Percentage 
Yede Price Change in Yede Price Change in
Changes Yede Changes Yede
1999 706.67 700.23 –0.9 614.67 607.52 –1.2
2000 706.67 664.78 –5.9 614.67 578.43 –5.9
2001 706.67 674.42 –4.6 614.67 586.72 –4.5
2002 706.67 678.71 –4.0 614.67 590.03 –4.0
2003 706.67 685.31 –3.0 614.67 595.65 –3.1
2004 706.67 691.43 –2.2 614.67 601.63 –2.1
2005 706.67 689.20 –2.5 614.67 599.54 –2.5
2006 706.67 680.79 –3.7 614.67 593.04 –3.5
2007 706.67 676.73 –4.2 614.67 589.33 –4.1
2008 706.67 680.85 –3.7 614.67 591.44 –3.8
2009 706.67 734.97 4.0 614.67 637.51 3.7
2010 706.67 714.63 1.1 614.67 622.13 1.2
2011 706.67 690.92 –2.2 614.67 601.35 –2.2
Table 7: Contribution of Private Welfare Change and Inequality Change to
Overall Welfare (W) using Alternative Values of Inequality Aversion (E)
Inequality Aversion Parameter Value Inequality Aversion Parameter Value
E=0.3 E=0.8
Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
Change in Due to Due to Change in Due to Due to
Welfare Private Inequality Welfare Private Inequality
Welfare Change Welfare Change
1999 –0.6 87.7 12.3 –0.2 68.6 31.4
2000 –4.2 100.3 –0.3 –1.2 100.8 –0.8
2001 –3.2 100.1 –0.1 –0.9 100.5 –0.5
2002 –2.8 99.6 0.4 –0.8 98.2 1.8
2003 –2.1 99.0 1.0 –0.6 96.7 3.3
2004 –1.5 100.9 –0.9 –0.4 102.6 –2.6
2005 –1.7 100.2 –0.2 –0.5 100.6 –0.6
2006 –2.6 101.7 –1.7 –0.7 105.9 –5.9
2007 –3.0 100.9 –0.9 –0.8 103.8 –3.8
2008 –2.6 98.3 1.7 –0.8 95.0 5.0
2009 2.8 103.3 –3.3 0.7 111.2 –11.2
2010 0.8 96.7 3.3 0.2 89.7 10.3
2011 –1.6 100.8 –0.8 –0.4 103.7 –3.7
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to some extent on the value of the inequality aversion parameter and heavily
upon the choice of social welfare function. The absolute values of the welfare
measure (pre and post price change) are provided in Loughrey and
O’Donoghue (2011). In this particular social welfare function, an inequality
aversion parameter of 0.3 gives greater weight to the private household
changes than to the inequality component in each year. The value of 0.3 is
close to that found by Amiel et al. (1999) which used various forms of the leaky
bucket experiment. Madden (1995) found an estimated value of 0.36 for
Ireland based upon the indirect tax system of 1980. The use of the higher
inequality aversion parameter of 0.8 gives greater weight to the private
household changes than to the inequality component but to a lesser extent. 
The added value of the welfare measure over yede is that the welfare
measure calculates utility using the social welfare function rather than simple
money amounts. The welfare measure accelerates in response to the rate of
change in the cost of living. As the rate of change in the cost of living increases,
it has an accelerating affect on the welfare measure. This makes theoretical
sense. As the increase in the cost of living becomes greater, the value that is
placed upon each additional unit of lost consumption increases. That is
because the last unit of consumption lost will tend to have a greater value than
the first unit lost i.e., diminishing marginal utility and the ranking of goods.
This means that the percentage changes in overall welfare are always lower
than the percentage changes in the cost of living index shown in Tables 3, 4
and 5.  
The higher the value of the inequality aversion parameter, the lower the
percentage changes in welfare attributable to price changes. This is due to the
faster rate of diminishing marginal utility that is implied by the higher
inequality aversion parameter. The results in Table 7 show that the welfare
changes are much lower under the inequality aversion parameter value of 0.8
than with a parameter value of 0.3. In some cases the private household
welfare change and the inequality change work in opposite directions. The
private welfare change component can therefore exceed 100 per cent.
VI CONCLUSION
This paper examines the welfare effects attributable to price changes for
different household types and income levels in Ireland from 1999 to 2011. The
role of behavioural response to price changes is included in the estimation of
the welfare effects. The results show large differences in the welfare effects
according to household type and income level. There does not appear to be a
systematic relationship over time in terms of the relationship between the
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position of the household in the income distribution and the cost of living
change. An overall welfare measure including both efficiency and equity
components is calculated and the decomposition results show that the
efficiency component dominates the inequality component in all years. This
result is heavily dependent upon the choice of social welfare function. 
The behavioural response effect forms part of the efficiency component.
Table A2 shows that the average substitution bias is 0.33 using the LES
demand system and 0.12 using the LES demand system with an objective
measure of subsistence. This means that the behavioural response component
has been roughly between 2 and 11 per cent of the private household welfare
change attributable to price changes given that the cost of living changed by
about 3 per cent per annum. The size of the behavioural response component
appears to rival the size of the inequality component and the level of
inequality aversion in society could have a role in determining which
component is greater in a particular time period. Again this result is heavily
dependent upon the choice of social welfare function. 
The large variation in cost of living changes between household types and
income levels could be better reflected in the reporting of price indices by the
CSO. The mortgage interest repayment item needs to be disaggregated
between fixed, standard variable and tracker mortgages so that the welfare
effects of variability in mortgage interest rates can be better captured. In
addition, the availability of more frequently updated anonymised HBS data
could improve the accuracy of the budget share calculations. The 2011 CPI is
calculated based on December 2006 budget share weights and household
consumption patterns are likely to have shifted in the interim. The results
show that behavioural response to price changes has the capacity to reduce the
welfare costs of increases in the overall price level and conversely increase the
benefits of declines in the overall price level. We find that the size of the
behavioural response component is greater than the findings of Sommerville
(2004) albeit using a different demand system and time period.
This paper provides a partial equilibrium analysis as opposed to a macro-
wide general equilibrium analysis. The specific contributions of monetary
policy, fiscal policy and productivity towards the overall price level are
therefore excluded. An important cautionary note therefore is that all declines
in the overall price level should not be interpreted as a healthy sign for the
macro-economy. The co-existence of contractionary monetary and fiscal
policies in a deep recession tends to reduce both the price level and real output
as price rigidities and debt deflation begin to emerge. However, Ireland has
the third highest cost of living in the Euro Area (Eurostat, 2011). Reducing the
cost of living to the Euro Area average will require that increases in the overall
price level fall below the Euro Area average for the next five to ten years. The
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distributional effect of reaching the Euro Area average cannot be calculated
ex-post given that unforeseeable events and general equilibrium dynamics
must be considered. 
The prioritisation of the price level issue in the near future is subject to
the monetary costs or benefits that can accrue to households as well as private
firms and investors. This paper goes some way towards improving the
understanding of the cost of living issue so that households can assess more
closely the importance of consumer prices and mortgage interest costs to their
own welfare.   
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APPENDIX I
CRITERIA FOR TWELVE DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS
Group 1 – There is only one person in the household and none of the
individuals are aged 65 or over. The vast majority (approx. 85 per cent) of
these individuals are never-married, widowed or divorced. There are some
cases of individuals that are married but not residing with their spouse on a
permanent basis (approx. 15 per cent). 
Group 2 – There is only one person in the household and none of these
individuals are 65 or over. The majority of people in this group are widows or
widowers (approx. 65 per cent). The remainder include single people that have
never married (approx. 30 per cent) and a small minority that are divorced or
married but not residing with their spouse on a permanent basis.
Group 3 – There is only one adult and one child in the household. The vast
majority of the adults in this household have never married (approx. 90 per
cent). A small minority of the adults are divorce, widowed or married but not
residing with their spouse on a permanent basis. 
Group 4 – There is only one adult and there are at least two children in
the household. Approximately half of these households are headed by adults
that have never married and approximately 40 per cent are headed by married
people living not residing with their spouse on a permanent basis. About one
in ten are headed somebody that is divorced or widowed.
Group 5 – These households include married couples living together on a
permanent basis with no children in the household. Therefore all of these
households have two adults residing in them.
Group 6 – These households include couples living together on a
permanent basis with no children in the household. At least one of the adults
is aged 65 or over. All of these households have two adults residing in them.
Group 7 – These households include couples living together on a
permanent basis with one child in the household. 
Group 8 – These households include couples living together on a
permanent basis with two children in the household.
Group 9 – These households include couples living together on a
permanent basis with three children or more in the household.
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Group 10 – All individuals in these households are aged 65 or older. There
are more than two people living in these households. The vast majority are
headed by people in a married relationship aged 65 and over (approx. 80 per
cent) and the remainder are mainly either widowed or never married.
Group 11 – These are households with more than three people and at least
one of the household members is a child. The vast majority are headed by
people in a married relationship living together on a permanent basis (approx.
90 per cent) and the remainder are single, widowed, divorced or never
married.
Group 12 – Any household that does not qualify under the criteria for the
first eleven household groups enters this category. About 22 per cent of all
households in the survey fall into this category. This large percentage is due
to a number of factors. Approximately half of these households are headed by
unmarried adults living together but not considered to be spouses to one
another. Approximately half of the households in this category are headed by
people in married relationships living together on a permanent basis. All of
these households have a minimum of three adults in the household and none
of these households includes more than one child. 
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APPENDIX II
DATA
Table A1: Independent Variables for Budget Share Regressions
Consumption and Age and Household Household
Employment Education Size Tenure
Variables Variables Variables Variables 
Log of Total Co_age1 Number of Mortgage 
Consumption (Age-40)/10 children aged Holder
0-5 years old
Log of Total Co_age2 Number of children Outright 
Consumption (Co_age1 aged 5-13 years old Owner
Squared Squared)
Smoker Co_age3 (Co_age2 Number of children Tenant 
Squared) aged 14-20 years old Purchaser
Car owner Upper Secondary Number of people Local Authority
Education over 65 years old Tennant
Employee University Number of Adults Private 
Education aged 21 and over Tenant
Self-Employed Married Number of Bedrooms Rent Free
Other Employment Gender of New Resident – 
Household Head Less than ten 
years resident 
in the 
household (0,1)
Number of Earners Pension
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APPENDIX III
SUBSTITUTION BIAS IN THE LASPEYRES PRICE INDEX
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